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A Taxonomy for Social Engineering attacks 
 
Koteswara Ivaturi, Lech Janczewski  





As the technology to secure information improves, hackers will employ less technical means 
to get access to unauthorized data. The use of Social Engineering as a non tech method of 
hacking has been increasingly used during the past few years. There are different types of 
social engineering methods reported but what is lacking is a unifying effort to understand 
these methods in the aggregate. This paper aims to classify these methods through taxonomy 
so that organizations can gain a better understanding of these attack methods and accordingly 
be vigilant against them. 
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1.0 Introduction  
The term ‘social engineering’ is found to have its roots from the early 20th century political 
science field where it meant to represent smart methods that solve the social problems. Due to 
the positive connotations of the word ‘engineering’ it was appropriated for various social 
problems of the time. Karl Popper, in his book endorsed the idea as sense of social change 
based on well established instrumental knowledge (Hansson, 2006). Over the years, 
especially after the World War II the term gained a more negative flavour and was associated 
with the stereotyped designs employed by politicians to gain electoral advantage (Duff, 
2005). Today the negativity of the term still persists but has gained usage in field of 
Information Systems Security to describe cases where people are persuaded  to furnish 
critical information that should otherwise remain private (Hansson, 2006). This involves a 
gamut of things like revealing passwords, providing access to the organization’s internal 
infrastructure etc.; the concept has gained a lot attention over the recent years as a potent 
attack vector primarily because of the disastrous consequences it can cause.  
There has been a considerable increase in the number of research papers that studied this 
topic which is enough evidence that social engineering has attained academic significance. 
The literature provides studies on different methods of social engineering attacks through 
various case studies. Laribee (Laribee, 2006) suggests taxonomy to classify these attacks 
based on three broad criteria ‘close access techniques’ ‘online social engineering’ and 
intelligence gathering. However, the list of different attack vectors that especially fall under 
online social engineering is not updated and ‘information gathering’ as we will have 
discussed below is not strictly unique to social engineering. In another study David Harley 
(Harley, 1998) suggests of a taxonomy that lists a few social engineering attacks but we feel 
it lacks the clarity and comprehensibility required for a good taxonomy. A taxonomy is 
required when it is necessary to provide a clear and consistent overview of a phenomenon 
without any obvious overlap (Hansman & Hunt, 2005). A good taxonomy is the one that is 
mutually exclusive, unambiguous and comprehensive and comprehensible (Lindqvist & 
Jonsson, 1997) and the aim of this paper is to provide a taxonomy for social engineering 
attacks in line with these requirements.  
The paper starts by introducing the nature and impact of social engineering attacks in 
Sections 2 & 3. Section 4 lays the groundwork for the taxonomy by describing the anatomy 
of a social engineering attack, and finally Section 5 discusses the new proposed taxonomy by 
describing each type of attack vector and the reasons why it falls under a particular category. 
Section 6 briefly discusses possible countermeasures to mitigate the effect of these attacks 
and finally we conclude the paper with Section 7 by discussing the potential of this taxonomy 
and future research directions.  
 
 
2.0 Nature of social engineering attacks 
There are many interpretations and definitions of the term available throughout the literature. 
Though the exact wording of most of the available definitions varies, the common essence 
that emanates from each of them is that social engineering involves methods that can control 
human behaviour to one’s objective utility. It is generally accepted that the main chink in the 
armour of any organization’s security architecture is the people of the organization and that is 
where that attack starts (Barber, 2001; Barrett, 2003; Mitnick & Simon, 2003). A social 
engineer can control the victim’s behaviour usually by evoking strong human emotions. The 
usual route is that the attacker weaves a plausible story in order to bag the trust of his victim. 
The story commonly used in such situations is filled with basic human instincts like greed, 
sympathy or fear (Townsend, 2010). The way in which attackers gain such trust is by 
persistently persuading the victim to connect to these emotions. Rusch mentions two ways of 
persuading an individual: (1) through sound analytical reasoning called ‘central route to 
persuasion’ or (2) through eliciting emotions called ‘peripheral route to persuasion’ 
(Thornburgh, 2004). As a social engineer would usually employ deceptive or manipulative 
methods the ‘central route to persuasion’ is not really an option and hence mostly uses the 
later method. There are people who knowingly reveal personal information in spite of the 
awareness of the inherent risks involved (Calluzzo & Cante, 2004; Straub & Nance, 1990). 
This is primarily seen in the cases where the human emotion evoked is that of greed, for 
example, downloading ‘browser-codec’ from unknown sources in order to watch a video 
online, filling in details of personal information in order to receive a free gift etc., There are 
also many examples that elicit the exploitation of the human fear factor for example, privates 
(lowest ranking officials) admitting to allowing unauthorized entry of higher ranking 
professionals (Thornburgh, 2004) due to the fear of reprisals etc. 
  
 
3.0 Impact of social engineering attacks 
Every social engineering attack is usually associated with an end goal. The goal can be 
anything from critical issues like getting administrative access of the company’s network to 
less critical issues like taking a self-guided tour of the premises etc., and often the attacker 
has to deploy an attack plan at various nodes of the chain en route to the goal. Every instance 
of an attacker getting what he or she wants through social engineering means can be 
considered to be a successful attempt even though the significance of the information 
obtained might not be immense (Thornburgh, 2004). It is often the cumulative effect of the 
success of many such attacks that the attacker is ultimately after. Social engineering 
techniques hence are considered to be a means to an end and not necessarily a one step attack.  
Over the recent years there has been a lot of focus on building new and improving existing 
countermeasures for the orthodox technical attacks. Innovations in security technologies such 
as anti-viruses, intrusion detection systems (IDS), firewalls and patch management systems 
have all been able to achieve a substantial mitigating effect on the prevalence of technical 
attacks  (Twitchell, 2006). As a result, more attackers are employing social engineering 
methods by targeting the human elements and often combine such techniques with their 
traditional technical methods. A successful social engineering attack can hence simply nullify 
the effect of the millions of dollars invested in the security architecture of the organization 
(Manske, 2000). 
 
4.0 Social Engineering Attack Methods 
There are many types of Social Engineering attacks and the variety and scope of such attacks 
are only limited to the imagination and creativity of the attacker  (Manske, 2000). 
Traditionally, social engineering is largely divided into two categories (1) Human-based 
social engineering and (2) Technology based social engineering (Aiello, 2007; Damle, 2002; 
Gulati, 2003).  
With regards to the field of information systems, the ultimate goal of a social engineer is to 
gain direct access to a company’s information either physically or digitally through access of 
its information systems (Thornburgh, 2004). Unlike traditional hacking methods, where the 
attacker needs to be technically equipped to carry out an attack, a social engineer needs to 
focus on his social skills in order to carry out a successful attack. Bhagyavati mentions that 
there are usually three major phases of a typical social engineering attack (Bhagyavati, 2007). 
 
1. Preparation phase 
2. Attack phase  






                     Fig1: The anatomy of a Social Engineering attack. 
 
 
Kevin Mitnick (Mitnick & Simon, 2003) also describes the ‘Social Engineering Cycle’ 
having four distinct stages which are research, developing rapport or trust, exploiting trust 
and utilizing trust.  
The aim of this paper as mentioned before is to provide a taxonomy that gives a good 
overview of the different types of social engineering attacks and hence we concentrate only 
on the attack phase as we believe that the other two, preparation and post attack, are generic 
phases required for any type of attack. There are many sources that quote shoulder surfing, 
dumpster diving as types social engineering attacks (Granger, 2001; Manske, 2000). 
Although they help attackers in gathering intelligence in the preparation phase, they do not 
involve any form social interaction with the victim, which is a basic need to be categorized as 
a social engineering attack. Hence we do not classify them as social engineering attack 
methods as part of our taxonomy.  
 
 
5.0 Taxonomy for Social Engineering  
 
5.1 Person-Person 
The type of attacks that can be categorized as Person-Person social engineering are typically 
the ones that involve direct or in person interaction of the attacker with the victim where the 
attacker uses deceptive methods to take advantage of the victim’s ignorance or his 
behavioural weakness and exploits the trust (Kamal & Crews, 2008). 
 
5.1.1 Impersonation  
Impersonation is arguably one of the most valued techniques that a social engineer can use as 
it can be carried out with little preparation and has the advantage of not revealing real 
identities (Redmon, 2005).  
 
5.1.1.1 Pretexting 
One of the popular impersonation techniques is called pretexting, which is the practice of 
obtaining information under false pretense. It is often more than a simple lie as it involves a 
lot of research on the victim before carrying out the attack. One of the widely quoted cases of 
pretexting is the HP scandal case where security experts used this method on the board 
members of the company to investigate the trail of a data leak of the company’s strategy 
(Baer), 2008). The investigators impersonated as the board members themselves in order to 
get access to the phone records. This created quite a stir in the media and eventually led way 
to birth of a new law (Menn, 2010) that prohibits the use of such techniques for obtaining any 
information under false pretense, including the use of fraudulent statements or impersonation.  
 
5.1.1.2 Reverse Social Engineering 
The attacker presents himself as a person in a perceived position of authority which 
influences the victim to ask more questions instead of the attacker. The orchestration of such 
an attack usually spans three stages which are sabotage, advertising and assisting (Granger, 
2001). For example, the attacker firsts sabotages the network of the organization, then 
advertises himself as a right person with a solution and with a bit of assistance from the 
victim fixes the problem. In the last stage he gets what he really needs by requesting the 
victim to log into the network under the aforementioned pretext. Such attacks are highly 
effective as it leaves the victim with a sense of satisfaction as the network problem goes away 
and hence leaves no reason for suspicion. This type of an attack is also termed as Quid pro 
quo where the attacker provides some incentive that persuades the victim to divulge 
information that otherwise would not be shared.  
 
5.1.1.3 Tailgating  
Tailgating simply means following a person with authorized entry into a secure area, 
basically riding on coattails (Long, 2008). The act may be considered to be legal or illegal 
depending on the circumstance but in general this term has a negative connotation and is used 
to describe an illegal act.  
The common denominator for all the above mentioned attacks is that the attacker builds a 
character and then fabricates a misleading story around this character which is aimed at 
evoking the victim’s basic human emotions of greed, sympathy or fear (Workman, 2008). 
The attacker must be able to simply anticipate and prepare for questions that might be asked 
by the victim. In order to facilitate this and to further project credibility to the story, the 
attacker usually uses two tools (1) using the company lingo in the story and (2) portrays 
knowledge personnel and policy (Thompson, 2006). A typical story involves a character and 
a context which the attacker uses as a vector. The character can either be a fake one 
originating from a figment of the attacker’s imagination or a real character that the attacker 
wishes to masquerade as. These types of attacks are increasingly becoming easier to 
orchestrate with the help of public databases such as LinkedIn & XING, which give the 
attacker organizational structure along with names of individuals and the positions they 
occupy (Huber, 2009; Roßling & Muller, 2009). To gain a broader understanding of such 
person-person attacks we categorize them into two broad categories (1) Impersonating by 
building a fake persona & (2) Impersonating a real persona. These two categories should 
include all case scenarios discussed above like pretexting, reverse social engineering or quid 
pro quo. One thing to observe here is that the conceptual aspects of these methods are not 
necessarily used as attack vectors only for person-person scenarios but could be also be used 
via other media as well as discussed below.  
 
5.2 Person-Person via media 
All attack vectors which do not involve the physical presence of the attacker are categorized 
as the Person-Person via media attacks. The ubiquitous use of computers and mobile phones 
has helped the social engineering attackers gain more viable and scalable options for carrying 
out their attacks. The use of media as an attack vector often has more advantages than the in 
person attacks as it simultaneously gives the attacker the power of anonymity and scalability. 
Text, voice and video are the three types of media that are taken into consideration for the 
taxonomy.  
 
5.2.1 Person-Person via Text 
This category includes all types of attacks that use text as a medium for communication. 
Examples are activities that are involved with the Internet like email, browsing, chatting and 
social networking to short messaging services (SMS) or even traditional offline media like 
mail and news papers. The various types of attacks under this category are discussed below. 
 
5.2.1.1 Phishing 
Phishing is a fraudulent process of acquiring sensitive and personal information by 
masquerading as a trustworthy entity and is mostly carried out over email. Over the years this 
problem has not only grown in size but also in complexity (Lee, Choi, & Kim, 2007). 
Typically, the attacker generates hundreds of random email addresses and sends a blanket 
email to all of them hoping that at least a small percentage of the potential victims will take 
the ‘bait’. The nature of the ‘bait’ involves a realistic looking message with a fraudulent call-
to-action and a website that the attacker uses to collect the victim’s information. This is a 
type of attack where the attacker is deceptively influencing the victim and persuading him to 
divulge sensitive information.  
 
5.2.1.2 SMSishing 
This form of attack though not prevalent yet, can be an effective tool for a social engineer 
especially due to the explosion in the use of cellular phones. The anatomy of this type of an 
attack is very similar in nature to the concept of phishing but is different in that the fraudulent 
message, instead of being sent as an email, is sent as a SMS to the victim’s cellular device 
(Binay, 2009).  
 
 
5.2.1.3 Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)  
This is a type of attack where the attacker tricks the victim’s browser into performing 
undesired actions on behalf of the victim (OWASP). The vulnerability exploited here is the 
browser’s functionality of not being able to distinguish between user generated requests and 
malicious requests especially when the victim is already logged into a website. But the 
instantiation of such attacks is by sending an email to the victim that looks legitimate but 
carries a malicious code in the form of any common HTML element like an image tag, script 
tag etc., As soon the victim opens the email, the browser executes the HTML elements 
without any form of verification as it thinks the user is still logged in. This form of an attack 
is also called as Session Riding.  
 
5.2.1.4 Malware 
This attack is probably the most effective and hence most successful of all types of social 
engineering attacks due to its pervasive and persistent nature. This attack vector is a 
combination of both psychological and technical ploys and usually feeds on unsuspecting 
average users, a number that runs in thousands (Abraham & Chengalur-Smith, 2010).  As the 
technology that thwarts malware has evolved so has the complexity of the malware attacks 
primarily due to the reason that the psychological tactics of the attackers also evolved. 
Another reason this attack is so successful is because there are so many forms and platforms 
that the attacker can use to unleash these attacks. Today the word personal computers has 
taken a whole new meaning with different form factors available like smart phones and 
tabloids, all of them having the ability to connect to the web and hence all them being viable 
avenues for attack.  
Whatever device and platform used the reason the problem of malware has been so persistent 
is because the attacker is using his social skills in trying to persuade the victim in order to 
perform an action that benefits him. The tactics employed as discussed above can be anything 
that the victim could connect to like curiosity, fear or greed. The following are examples of 
such attacks and the tactics involved that make them successful.   
 
Email: 
This is the most prevalent form to launch a malware attack primarily due to the ubiquity of 
the application, it is reported that by 2013 approximately 1.9 billion people will be using 
emails as their primary form of communication (Reardon, 2009). The tactics used here to 
persuade the user to perform an action mentioned in the email could be by eliciting the 
victim’s curiosity by using catchy and intriguing lines that make the victim open the email. 
The ‘Lovebug’ worm in 2000 is a great example of this, where the attacker’s email had the 
subject line ‘ILOVEYOU’ and an attachment that looked like a text file which made the 
unsuspecting and curious open the attachment only to be infected with a script that sent a 
copy of itself and everyone in the address book on behalf of the victim.  
 
Popups:  
Popups are random alerts messages that open in a new window and are usually used as means 
for online advertising. The attackers use this form of attack to present messages that elicit the 
victim’s fear or greed quotient that will eventually persuade them to perform the intended call 
for action. The recent examples include the emergence of ‘scareware’ where popups appear 
that contain a fake message stating that victim’s computer has been detected with a virus and 
that the user has to download a particular anti-virus to remove it (FBI, 2010). The typical user 
panics and downloads the software with the intent to fix his computer but in doing so 
inadvertently infects his computer with malware carried in the software.  
 
Search Engine poisoning: 
Search engine poisoning (SEP) occurs when the attacker lures people to his website by 
employing certain ‘black hat’ or unethical techniques. When the unsuspecting user clicks on 
the search engine result, because he deems it to be relevant to his query, he is redirected to 
another website that tries to persuade the user to download a certain malware.  
 
A typical attack of this form usually kick-starts when there is a significant global event. Tools 
like Google trends are used to monitor such phenomena and whenever a particular keyword is 
found to be trending, the attackers build fake websites seeded with malware and expose it to 
the internet (Townsend, 2010). The social engineering angle for this form of an attack is in 
the fact that the attacker is exploiting the trust that users have in the search results provided 
by the search engines to launch the malware attack. SEP is becoming increasingly popular as 
it doesn’t even need to elicit the human emotions required for a typical social engineering 
attack as it is already created through the occurrence of the global events.  
 
Social networking:  
Attack methods using social networking software is also on the rise purely due to the ubiquity 
of such platforms. Recently Facebook reported to have acquired its 500 millionth user 
(approximately 8.5% of the world’s population) and there many such applications that are 
growing in popularity providing another juicy avenue for the attackers to exploit. Twitter, a 
popular social networking site has been a subject of numerous social engineering attacks. A 
typical attack is where the attacker creates a fake profile that has a message and a link which 
is a shortened form of a full URL, using services like tinyurl.com. The victims are persuaded 
to click on the link which downloads the malware without permission (Naraine, 2008). 
 Again, the Social engineering angle here is in the fact that the victim’s trust is exploited 
when he is asked to click on a disguised and shortened form of a malicious URL containing 
malware from a trusted source in his social network.   
 
 
5.2.2 Person-Person via Voice 
All types of attacks which do not have the attacker’s physical presence but use voice as a 
medium for communication could be slotted into this category. These include the use of both 
the cellular network where the attacker carries out the attack over cell phones and also the 
Internet where the attacker can choose to carry his attack leveraging IP-based voice 




Vishing is the practice of using the cellular network or VOIP into providing personal, 
financial and other sensitive information for personal benefit (Ollmann, 2007). The attack is 
analogous to phishing and SMSishing as discussed before but is different in that it is carried 
out over the phone using voice as a medium. A typical vishing attack is when a victim gets a 
phone call with a pre-recorded message asking the victim to call back to verify credibility of 
bank details. When the victim calls the bank an IVR system is set up giving a number of 
options for the victim to choose. Regardless of what option the victim chooses, they will hear 
a message that asks them to authenticate themselves by dialling in their account and pin 
number. Once the information is provided the call is either terminated or redirected to the real 
customer service leaving the victim in a state of panic.  
 
 
5.2.3 Person-Person via Video 
These types of attacks are the ones where the attacker may use video as a medium for 
communication to orchestrate social engineering attacks. The explosive growth in the use of 
internet and increasing broadband penetration around the world has been responsible for the 
success of websites like YouTube that allow people to share knowledge and communicate 
through videos. A typical attack of this kind could involve circulating a video claiming to be 
a ‘tutorial’ of sorts with a set of instructions to a pre-created problem created by the attacker. 
If an unsuspecting victim who is affected by the pre-created problem comes across this video 
online, he or she will willingly follow the instructions and fall prey to the set trap. This type 
of an attack is quite similar to the reverse engineering technique discussed earlier where the 
attacker lures the victim by claiming that he has a solution to a pre-created problem. Though 
there are no reports of such attacks in the media yet this is a definite viable avenue for the 
hackers to exploit given the number of people who are watching and sharing videos online 
today. 
   
6.0 Countermeasures for Social Engineering 
The most basic definition of social engineering is hacking the human brain. Regardless of the 
technological advances in the security field this form of attack will be persistent as it is 
difficult to upgrade or patch human brains as we can to technology (Townsend, 2010). The 
best strategy is to engage in activities that raise the awareness levels of such attacks through 
education. A multi layered strategy that implements training to increase awareness and 
enforces policies like ‘need-to-know’ access should be employed by organizations to mitigate 
the effect of these attacks. Social engineering is a game and hence the goal should be to make 
things difficult for the attacker and reduce or better remove the fun element so that the 
attacker moves on to a different target.  
7.0 Conclusion:  
In this paper we tried to bring some clarity to the different types of social engineering attacks 
through our taxonomy approach. We hope that this taxonomy will be useful to organizations 
to understand the attack vectors better and consequently be useful in building robust and 
effective countermeasures for the threats they impose. There definitely is a conscience that 
this taxonomy may not be complete yet in its entirety and hence we welcome any suggestions 
from the academic community to suggest any edits. The social methods employed to get 
around technological countermeasures is a dynamic process where the motivated attacker will 
always try to up the ante against the victim. As such, we will be documenting these changes 
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